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a b s t r a c t 
Objectives: To outline the situation in Ireland with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Methods: Analyse the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic in Ireland. Review the key public health and 
health system responses. 
Results: Over 1700 people have died with COVID-19 by July 19th while almost 30 0 0 people had been 
admitted to hospital with COVID-19. A high proportion of the deaths occurred in nursing homes and 
other residential centres who did not receive sufficient attention during the early phase of the pandemic. 
Conclusions: Ireland’s response to the COVID-19 crisis has been comprehensive and timely. Transparency, 
a commitment to a relatively open data policy, the use of traditional and social media to inform the 
population, and the frequency of updates from the Department of Health and the Health Services Execu- 
tive are all commendable and have led to a high level of compliance among the general public with the 
various non-medical measures introduced by the government. 
© 2020 Fellowship of Postgraduate Medicine. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 






























This paper outlines the situation in Ireland with regard to the 
OVID-19 pandemic. We begin by outlining some key indicators of 
opulation health in Ireland and a brief description of the health 
ystem. We then discuss the key health policy and health tech- 
ology aspects of the pandemic in Ireland. We analyse the avail- 
ble data on cases, hospitalisations and deaths, and outline the key 
ublic health initiatives undertaken by the government in Ireland. 
ur data analysis covers the period from February 29 when the 
rst case was reported up to July 19. The response of the health 
ystem is explored in detail. We also discuss the economic im- 
act of the virus to date and outline the very substantial finan- 
ial measures that have been implemented by the government to 
meliorate some of the effects of the pandemic, and the related 
ockdown, on individuals and businesses. The final section contains ∗ Corresponding author. 
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 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) uggestions for how the country may cope with the continuing 
resence of the virus. 
ountry description 
ociodemographic profile of Ireland 
According to the most recent census there were 4,689,921 peo- 
le classified as usually resident in Ireland in 2016. The Central 
tatistics Office (CSO) estimates that the population increased by 
.8% since then [1] . The breakdown of the 2019 estimates by region 
nd age group is contained in Table 1 . There is a heavy concentra- 
ion of the population in Dublin and the Mid-East region that sur- 
ounds Dublin, with over 43% of the population living in that area. 
verall, the population density is 72 people per square kilometre. 
he proportion of the population aged 65 or older is a little over 
4% while the proportion aged over 85 is just over 1.5%. Almost 
0 0,0 0 0 people (8.5% of the total population) lived alone in 2016 
nd, of these, 39% were aged 65 or older. Just over 41% of the pop-
lation aged 15 + were single while 47.7% of this age group were an open access article under the CC BY license 
B. Kennelly, M. O’Callaghan, D. Coughlan et al. Health Policy and Technology 9 (2020) 419–429 
Table 1 
Population estimates (‘0 0 0 s) for regions by age group, 2019. 
Border Midland West Dublin Mid-East Mid-West South-East South-West Ireland 
Male 202.5 153.0 230.2 683.3 359.8 242.3 216.6 350.3 2438.0 
Female 204.2 151.9 233.5 712.4 363.7 242.7 219.3 355.9 2483.5 
Total 406.7 304.9 463.7 1395.7 723.5 485.0 435.9 706.2 4921.5 
Age-groups 
0–14 86.5 69.2 94.0 263.2 163.9 98.2 91.1 143.0 1008.9 
15–24 51.0 38.9 57.2 175.2 92.6 60.9 54.9 87.4 618.0 
25–34 43.7 34.9 52.2 223.7 81.3 53.6 48.1 83.0 620.0 
35–44 58.2 46.8 69.2 240.3 117.0 71.3 64.5 109.2 776.9 
45–54 54.9 41.0 62.7 176.3 103.5 66.7 60.2 96.2 661.6 
55–64 47.4 33.5 54.6 139.2 76.4 57.1 50.7 80.8 539.7 
65–74 37.5 24.4 42.3 100.4 53.8 45.0 38.5 62.2 404.1 
75–84 19.8 12.2 22.6 56.5 26.2 23.8 20.8 32.9 214.9 
85 + 7.4 3.9 9.0 21.0 8.8 5.7 7.0 11.6 77.3 





















































































arried. There were almost 219,0 0 0 one-parent families in 2016, 
6% of which were headed by a female [1] . 
There were 44,531 people with at least one disability living in a 
ommunal establishment in 2016. Almost 70% of these were aged 
5 or older. There were approximately 10,0 0 0 homeless people in 
reland at the beginning of 2020, most of whom were living in 
emporary accommodation. Around 60 0 0 people seeking asylum in 
reland were living in Direct Provision Centres at the end of 2019, 
ith a further 1500 living in Emergency Accommodation Centres. 
here were almost 31,0 0 0 members of the Traveller community in 
reland in 2016. 11.4% of the population in 2016 were born outside 
f Ireland, mainly elsewhere in Europe [1] . 
ealth profile of the country 
Life expectancy at birth was 82.2 years for the whole popula- 
ion in 2017, 84.0 years for females and 80.4 years for males [2] .
eople aged 65 can expect to live for another 21.4 years on av- 
rage for women, and 19.0 years for men. Just under 28% of the 
opulation report having a chronic illness or health problem. The 
ercentage of the adult population that are smokers has declined 
teadily in recent years and now stands at 17%. Approximately 23% 
f the population in Ireland are obese. In 2016, 18.5% of the Irish 
opulation experienced some type of mental health disorder such 
s anxiety, schizophrenia, depression, alcohol abuse or drug abuse 
2] . 
verview of the health system 
Health policy in Ireland is determined by the Department 
f Health, headed by a Minister of Health, and publicly funded 
ealthcare is delivered by the Health Services Executive (HSE). 
here is also substantial private sector involvement in the delivery 
f healthcare, ranging from GPs to allied healthcare professionals 
o private hospitals. 
The Irish health system incorporates public, voluntary and pri- 
ate elements in the production, delivery and financing of health- 
are. People in Category I (which includes 36% of the population) 
re eligible for free healthcare in the public system (with signifi- 
ant co-payments for medicines). Most people who qualify for Cat- 
gory I entitlements do so on the basis of a means test while oth- 
rs do so depending on a diagnosis of a specified chronic illness. A 
urther 10% of the population have a limited form of eligibility in 
ategory 1 which entitles them to free GP visits [3] . 
The remainder of the population are in Category II, which en- 
itles them to care in the public hospital system subject to a co- 
ayment. They pay a full fee for visits to a GP. Many people in
ategory II as well as a minority of people in Category I buy pri-
ate health insurance which gives them access to privately sup- 420 lied care, some of which is provided in private hospitals but much 
f it is provided in public hospitals. Approximately 74% of health- 
are expenditure is funded by taxation, 14% by private health insur- 
nce and the remaining 12% of expenditure by out-of-pocket pay- 
ents. Further details about the Irish health system and proposals 
o reform it can be found in Connolly and Wren [3] , Cullinan et al.
4] and Burke et al. [5] . The CSO recommends that modified Gross 
ational Income be used as a measure of overall economic activ- 
ty rather than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because of the dis- 
roportionate effect of globalisation on Irish GDP. The proportion 
f modified Gross National Income that is spent on healthcare in 
reland was 12% in 2018 [6] . Per capita expenditure on health (ad- 
usted for purchasing power parities) was estimated to be $4915 in 
018 [2] . 
The number of practicing doctors in Ireland is 3.1 per 10 0 0, 
 relatively low figure by international standards. The number of 
urses, 12.2 per 10 0 0, is higher than the average in the OECD. 
here were a total of just over 10,0 0 0 hospital doctors in Ireland
n September 2019, 32% of whom were consultants. There were 2.9 
ospital beds per 10 0 0 inhabitants in Ireland in 2018 [2] . A partic-
lar concern at the beginning of the pandemic was the low num- 
er of ICU beds in Ireland. The total number of ICU beds in the 
ublic health system was estimated to be 255 in February 2020 or 
.5 ICU beds per 10 0,0 0 0 people. Long-term residential care in Ire- 
and is provided by publicly-owned, privately-owned and voluntary 
not-for-profit) care homes. There are approximately 25,0 0 0 people 
iving in nursing homes run by private and voluntary organisations 
nd a further 50 0 0 people living in public nursing homes. Pearce 
t al. [7] estimated that a significant proportion (between one half 
nd two thirds) of nursing home residents have dementia. 
rganizational structure of the public health policy response to 
OVID-19 
The National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET), a body of 
pproximately 30 medical, science and health service professionals, 
as activated in January 2020 to deal with the COVID-19 virus. 
ts chairman is the State’s Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Tony Holo- 
an. NPHET is supported by an Expert Advisory Group as well as 
1 sub-groups, including an expert modelling group. NPHET works 
losely with the HSE National Crisis Management Team which 
anages the HSE’s response. Questions have been raised in Dáil 
ireann (the Irish parliament) about the membership of NPHET 
nd the delay in minutes of meetings being released. The De- 
artment of the Taoiseach (Prime Minster) has given regular press 
riefings since March 12th. These typically include details of finan- 
ial supports for individuals and businesses. In May, a special par- 
iamentary committee was established to consider the State’s re- 


































































































ponse to the pandemic. The committee has been meeting weekly 
nd its proceedings are streamed live. 
OVID-19 data sources and trends 
verview of data availability 
There are four publicly available official online data sources re- 
ating to Ireland’s experience of the COVID-19 pandemic: 
1 Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC) website: www. 
hpsc.ie/ 
2 Department of Health (DoH) website: https://www.gov.ie/en/ 
organisation/department- of- health/ 
3 Irish government’s open data portal: https://data.gov.ie/ 
4 Health Service Executive (HSE) Daily Operations COVID- 
19 Update: https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/newsfeatures/ 
covid19-updates/ 
The HPSC, an agency within the HSE, is Ireland’s specialist 
gency for the surveillance of all communicable diseases. The HPSC 
ata forms the foundation for the other three sources as it collates 
ata relating to all confirmed and probable cases of COVID-19 in 
reland. The DoH updates, the governmental open data platform, 
nd the HSE daily operations updates all have additional unique 
eatures that make them useful in the context of data collection 
nd transparency. Since March 23rd, the HPSC has published daily 
pdate reports for NPHET on their website [8] . These reports pro- 
ide the following data specifically related to COVID-19: 
• number of new cases and cumulative number of cases. 
• number of new deaths and cumulative number of deaths. 
• number of hospitalisations and ICU admissions. 
• number of clusters of infection, broken down by geographic re- 
gion and the number of clusters in settings such as nursing 
homes. 
• breakdown of number of cases by age, range, gender and 
county. 
• breakdown of mode of transmission – community transmission, 
close contact with confirmed case or travel-related. 
The daily briefings from NPHET, which are also posted on the 
oH website, are subsets of the HPSC reports, but sometimes con- 
ain additional data such as the numbers of tests completed, the 
umber of recovered cases and more detailed information on spe- 
ial groups, such as those in residential care settings or healthcare 
orkers. However, these are not consistently reported. Data on re- 
overed and active cases was very slow to emerge in the begin- 
ing but have been reported on a more regular basis since April 
1st. The DoH also uses its website to update the general public 
bout the findings of bi-weekly population surveys about public 
entiment relating to the COVID-19 response and related restric- 
ions in place. Finally, minutes of NPHET meetings are published 
n the DOH website with, at times, a considerable lag. 
The Irish government’s open data portal ( https://data.gov.ie/ ) is 
esigned to provide easy access to datasets held by public bodies 
n Ireland. These datasets are free to use, reuse, and redistribute. 
ince late March, the Health section of the open data portal has 
eatured several datasets relating to the COVID-19 pandemic which 
an easily be used for analysis by researchers and the general pub- 
ic. Since mid-May, the Central Statistics Office have published a 
eries of information bulletins containing an analysis of people 
ho have died or contracted COVID-19 [9] . These bulletins con- 
ain data not previously available, such as a breakdown of deaths 
y county. 
Since April 13th, the HSE has released daily updates [10] de- 
cribing the acute hospital activity related to COVID-19. These up- 
ates offer a succinct summary of the situation in each of Ireland’s 421 ublic hospitals and critical care units in relation to COVID-19. Cur- 
ent COVID-19 admissions, occupancy due to COVID-19 and non- 
OVID disease, and available bed capacity in terms of regular beds 
nd critical care beds are all included in these updates. Individual 
ospitals are listed by name and this offers some additional visi- 
ility on where in the country COVID-19 is most active. 
ow has the virus spread? 
Our data analysis covers the period from February 29, when 
he first case was reported, up to July 19. From the outset, cases 
ere defined as people who had tested positive for COVID-19. De- 
pite initial ambitious plans by the HSE to test widely, it became 
lear quite quickly that laboratory capacity could not meet the de- 
and created by the broad definition of criteria for testing. GPs 
uickly identified thousands of patients with respiratory symptoms 
s part of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. These patients 
ere referred for testing before the capacity existed to either con- 
uct or to analyse this level of testing in a timely fashion, which 
eant there were considerable delays in the system. Testing crite- 
ia were changed on March 24th. The new criteria stated that indi- 
iduals must be suffering from two symptoms, have a respiratory 
isease, and be a contact of a confirmed or suspected case, and 
lso be in a priority group to be eligible for testing. Some testing 
as outsourced to German laboratories to clear the backlog. These 
utsourced test results were delayed coming back into the system 
hich created a 10-day period in mid-April where these test re- 
ults were returned in bulk and reported in the daily HPSC and 
oH updates. This led to a spike in apparent virus activity which 
as, in fact, an artefact of the delays. 
Initially, for a death to be classified as a COVID-19 death, it was 
ontingent on the patient having a laboratory-confirmed diagnosis 
f COVID-19 before their death. Since April 24th, the HPSC have 
ncluded ‘probable’ deaths (i.e. deaths where the cause was likely 
OVID-19 but where the patient was not tested before death) in 
he total deaths tally. Deaths include people who died in either 
rivate homes or long term residential institutions in the commu- 
ity as well as people who died in hospital. This complete tally of 
ospital patients, community patients and probable cases has re- 
ained the standard reporting format since April 24th. 
The majority of cases in Ireland have been in the east of the 
ountry, with 48% of cases occurring in Dublin. More broadly, a 
lock of ten counties in the east, north-east and midlands, ac- 
ount for almost 75% of the total number of cases (see Fig. 1 ).
nitially, most cases had a history of foreign travel, most notably 
o Northern Italy, but by the end of April community transmission 
ccounted for almost two-thirds of total cases. Fig. 2 shows the 
umber of new cases each day. The peak of new cases occurred 
n mid-April. However, positive COVID-19 results returning in bulk 
rom foreign laboratories around this time complicates this some- 
hat, as date of reporting lagged significantly behind date of sam- 
ling. While the large majority of cases recovered without needing 
o be hospitalised, 12.9% of cases did require hospitalisation while 
.6% of cases were admitted to ICU [8] . Reporting of cumulative 
OVID-19 deaths also rose sharply on April 22nd (see Fig. 3 ). This 
s due to the fact that at this point the HPSC and DOH began re-
orting “probable” deaths, where patients died of a COVID-19-like 
llness prior to testing positive for COVID-19. 
As seen in Figs. 4 and 5 , COVID-19 hospitalisations and ICU 
dmissions both began to decrease in the second week of April. 
hile the complications of infection of COVID-19 lag behind the 
mergence of first symptoms by 7 to 10 days, hospitalisations and 
CU admissions are less prone to the nuances of the variations in 
OVID-19 testing strategies and reporting dates. 
The initial focus in Ireland was on how the virus was spreading 
n the general community, but by the end of March it was clear 
B. Kennelly, M. O’Callaghan, D. Coughlan et al. Health Policy and Technology 9 (2020) 419–429 


















































hat the virus has spread widely in a substantial number of long- 
erm residential settings. There have been 257 clusters (defined as 
 or more cases) in nursing homes and 184 clusters in other resi- 
ential settings. Nursing homes and residential settings in the east 
nd north-east have been especially vulnerable, with 67% of the 
lusters in long-term residential settings occurring in these areas. 
ealthcare workers in Ireland have also been disproportionately af- 
ected by COVID-19, with 32% of cases being detected in healthcare 
taff [8] . 
The HSE daily operations update [10] offers the most granu- 
ar breakdown of hospital activity related to COVID-19, particularly 
ritical care activity. It includes the measure “Total Critical Care 
eds Open & Staffed”, which is arguably a more important mea- 
ure than ventilator availability. No figures are available as to the 
umber of people isolating at home. This may become a more rel- 
vant measure as society-wide restrictions are relaxed and more 
ocused efforts are employed to control COVID-19 activity. 
Initially, the number of new cases grew rapidly and increases 
xceeded 40% on some days. The public health restrictions im- Fig. 2. Cases p
422 osed by the government and the high level of compliance with 
hese restrictions and general public health advice slowed the 
pread of the virus very significantly. On April 24th, the daily 
ncrease in cases fell below 5%, and dropped sharply thereafter, 
alling below 1% growth consistently since mid-May. Similar trends 
an be seen in the “flattening of the curve” of new hospitalisa- 
ions and new admissions to ICU. The growth in new cases fell 
o around 0.1% in the first two weeks of June and has remained 
ery low since. An increase in the number of new cases in the first 
wo weeks of July followed an easing of lockdown restrictions and 
ed to a postponement of the final phase of a plan to re-open the 
conomy (see Section 4 below). 
Table 2 provides a breakdown by age range of cases and deaths. 
t is clear that older Irish patients are at a far higher risk of re-
uiring hospital care and of dying from COVID-19. The mean and 
edian ages of people who have died is 82 and 84 years respec- 
ively [8] (this only refers to deaths where a laboratory test con- 
rmed the presence of COVID-19). Over 45% of people who died 
ere aged 85 or older even though this group only accounted for 
.2% of cases. Males make up 43% of cases while they account for 
9% of deaths. Fig. 6 shows the distribution of deaths by county 
s of July 3rd. The distribution of deaths closely matches the dis- 
ribution of cases with a large proportion of deaths occurring in 
he north-east and east of the country. Information on the pres- 
nce of co-morbidities is available for about 75% of cases and 82% 
f deaths. As of June 10th, 42% of patients who have died from 
OVID-19 had chronic heart disease, 31% suffered from a chronic 
eurological condition and 17% had a chronic respiratory disease. 
he CSO has analysed the spatial distribution of standard mortal- 
ty rates according to the deprivation level of the area that the 
erson who died was normally resident in [9] . The analysis was 
arried out using deprivation indexes for small areas. Nationally, er day. 
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Fig. 4. Hospitalisations per day. 
Fig. 5. ICU Admissions per day. 
Table 2 






Cases (%) Cases hospitali-sed (n) Cases hospitali-sed (%) 
Cases admitted 
to ICU (n) 
Cases admitted 
to ICU (%) 
Number of cases who 
died (n) 
Cases who died 
(%) 
< 5 183 0.7 23 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
5–14 338 1.3 17 0.5 2 0.5 0 0.0 
15–24 1960 7.6 76 2.3 5 1.1 1 0.1 
25–34 4353 16.9 198 5.9 15 3.4 5 0.3 
35–44 4532 17.6 274 8.2 36 8.2 13 0.7 
45–54 4607 17.9 448 13.4 91 20.8 26 1.5 
55–64 3274 12.7 497 14.9 127 29.1 71 4.1 
65–74 1824 7.1 586 17.5 109 30.0 246 14.0 
75–84 2302 8.9 745 22.3 46 10.5 597 34.1 
85 + 2372 9.2 477 14.3 6 1.4 792 45.2 
Unknown 21 0.08 1 0.03 0 0.0 2 0.1 
Total 25,766 100.0 3342 100.0 437 100.0 1753 100.0 


















tandard mortality rates have been highest in the least deprived 
uintile and second highest in the most deprived quintile. So far, 
o individual-level analysis of the socio-economic background of 
eople who have died has been possible as the data has not been 
eleased. 
8144 of the 25,333 (32%) cases relate to healthcare workers. Of 
he 8018 healthcare workers infected up to May 30th, 88% got the 
irus in a healthcare setting, 4% got the virus from contact with 
 confirmed case, 3% got the virus from travel, 3% got the virus 
rom community transmission and 1% got the virus from a health- 
are setting as a patient. Seven healthcare workers have died from s
423 he virus. Over a third of the healthcare workers infected by the 
nd of April were nurses while almost a quarter were healthcare 
ssistants [8] . 
olicy and technology road map 
Ireland has followed a multi-faceted approach to the COVID-19 
risis involving measures to: 1) limit the spread of the virus in 
he community and specific institutional settings, 2) test and trace 
uspected contacts, 3) ensure that there were adequate healthcare 
ervices and equipment available for people who became seriously 
B. Kennelly, M. O’Callaghan, D. Coughlan et al. Health Policy and Technology 9 (2020) 419–429 




























































































ll with the virus, and 4) limit the financial burden on individuals 
nd businesses due to the response to the virus. Extensive use of 
 large number of health and non-health technologies have been 
mployed including diagnostic testing and the use of medical de- 
ices. In the period immediately after the first cases were reported 
n Ireland, the Government and the Public Health authorities tried 
o delay as much as possible the disease (this period is known as 
he ‘delay phase’). Approximately one month after the first case, 
he Government and the Public Health authorities moved to the 
mitigation phase’ where the main goal was to contain as much as 
ossible the health and economic impact of the pandemic. 
ealth policy developments during the COVID-19 delay phase 
From the outset, public health advice from the Government 
nd the HSE to the community at large has emphasised frequent 
and-washing, appropriate respiratory etiquette (recommending 
hat people cover their mouth and nose with a tissue or sleeve 
hen coughing or sneezing), the importance of maintaining a two 
etre distance between people, and the need to avoid touching 
ne’s eyes, nose and mouth [11] . More recently, the importance 
f wearing face coverings on public transport and in indoor set- 
ings has been emphasised. Traditional and social media have been 
xtensively used to convey basic public health messages. Table 3 
ummarises the key health policy initiatives that have been imple- 
ented in Ireland since the beginning of March. The table follows 
he classification system developed by Moy et al. [12] . They clas- 
ify measures based on their impact; minimal, medium, significant 
r very significant, and which category the measure falls into; con- 
ainment, economic impact, prevention and care and health tech- 
ology and finally whether the measure represents an escalation 
increasing measures to respond to increases in active cases) or de- 
scalation (easement of measures). See Moy et al. [12] for a further 
xplanation. 
On March 9th, the annual St Patrick’s Day parades were can- 
elled and an initial increase of €435 million in funding to deal 
ith the impact of COVID-19 was announced for the HSE. On 
arch 12th, Ireland entered the delay phase of dealing with the 424 andemic. The government ordered schools, colleges, childcare fa- 
ilities and state-run cultural institutions to close. Indoor gather- 
ngs of more than 100 people and outdoor gatherings of more 
han 500 people were banned. Mandatory closure of pubs was an- 
ounced on March 15th. 
On March 24th the government introduced a second raft of 
andatory measures. These included the closure of non-essential 
usinesses such as retail outlets, gyms, hairdressers, outdoor mar- 
ets and libraries while hotels were limited to cater for essential 
on-social and non-tourist guests. Cafés and restaurants were only 
ermitted to supply take-away food and delivery. All indoor and 
utdoor sporting activities were cancelled. All playgrounds were 
losed and places of worship were required to restrict numbers 
nd adhere to physical distancing. Essential services (such as su- 
ermarkets) were required to implement physical distancing. In- 
ividuals were not permitted to take unnecessary travel either 
ithin Ireland or overseas. Physical distancing was required when 
utside and social gatherings of more than four individuals were 
rohibited (except for members of the same household). Individu- 
ls were required to work from home unless they worked in es- 
ential services. 
olicy developments during the COVID-19 mitigation phase 
On March 27th Ireland moved to the mitigation phase and in- 
roduced a third range of additional measures [13] . People were 
sked to stay at home unless to undertake essential work or access 
ssential services. Exercise and travel were restricted to 2 kilome- 
res of an individual’s home and individuals were not permitted to 
rrange gatherings with anyone outside their households. The gov- 
rnment issued cocooning guidelines for anyone over 70 or medi- 
ally vulnerable, asking them not to leave their houses. To ease the 
urden of cocooning, a community call initiative was introduced 
n April 2nd to mobilise volunteers to help cocooning citizens. 
To enhance compliance with the measures, An Garda Síochána 
the Irish Police Service) was given additional powers including ar- 
est without warrant. Non-compliance with a direction of a Garda 
ithout a lawful excuse is considered a criminal offence and is 
unishable by a fine of up to €2500, up to six months impris- 
nment, or a combination of both. The Government also had the 
ower to detain a person who refuses to remain in a specific place 
such as a home or a hospital) if they are deemed by a medical 
rofessional to be a potential source of infection and/or a risk to 
ublic health, and detention is necessary to slow the spread of 
OVID-19. As of July 1st, 320 people had been arrested for breach- 
ng the restrictions [14] . 
On May 1st the Taoiseach announced a Roadmap to reopen the 
conomy and society [15] . Initially, the roadmap contained a five 
hase reopening process with the first phase beginning on May 
8th and the final phase on 10th August with three week peri- 
ds between phases. On June 8th, the government announced an 
ccelerated re-opening with a four phase process rather than five 
hases and with the final phase scheduled to begin on July 20th. 
n additional acceleration of the re-opening was announced on 
une 19th which meant that most commercial activity was able to 
esume in some form or other from June 29th. However, on July 
5th, the government announced that the final (fourth) phase of 
e-opening would not in fact begin until August 10th. Details of 
hat are included in the phases of the roadmap are included in 
able 3 . 
se of technology in disease detection and prevention 
Technology has played a major role in Ireland’s response to the 
andemic. In the health sector, diagnostic testing, clinical trials, use 
f medical devices and eHealth systems have all been employed to 
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Table 3 
List of key measures introduced in Ireland and categorised based on the classification system developed by Moy et al., (2020). 
Month Date Key Public Measures Classification Categories Type ∗
February 29th: 1st Case of COVID-19 confirmed in Ireland 
March 9th Annual St. Patrick’s day parade cancelled throughout Ireland. Medium Containment + 
9th Initial €3 billion financial support introduced including income support ( €2.4 billion); business 




9th HSE additional financial support ( €435 million) Medium Prevention 
and Care 
+ 
12th Mandatory closures of schools, colleges, childcare facilities and state run cultural institutions. 
Indoor gatherings of more than 100 people and outdoor gatherings of more than 500 people 
banned. People encouraged to work from home. 
Medium Containment + 
15th Pubs closed. Significant Containment + 
17th “Be on call for Ireland initiative launched” to recruit additional healthcare workers to HSE Significant Prevention 
and Care 
+ 
24th Closure of non-essential businesses All indoor and outdoor sporting activities cancelled. All 
playgrounds/campgrounds closed and places of worship required to restrict numbers and adhere 
to physical distancing. Essential services required to implement physical distancing. Citizens not 
permitted to take unnecessary travel either within Ireland or overseas. Physical distancing 
required when outside and social gatherings of no more than four individuals allowed (except 
for members of the same household). Citizens required to work from home unless they worked 
in essential services. 
Significant Containment + 
24th Easier re-registration for former health care workers and former members of the defense force. Medium Prevention 
and Care 
+ 
24th Announcement that private hospitals would become part of the public hospital system for the 






24th A raft of financial measures introduced included higher unemployment supports, covid-19 sick 
leave payments and introduction of wage subsidy scheme to co-fund 70% of cost of salaries up 





27th Stay at home measures announced for all but essential workers exercise for everybody else 




27th People aged 70 + or medically vulnerable advised not to leave home Minimal Containment + 
1400 public service workers received training in contact tracing (various dates) Medium Prevention 
and Care 
+ 
April 8th An Garda Síochána (the Irish Police Service) given additional powers including arrest without 
warrant, under 
the Health Act 1947 (Section 31A-Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) Regulations) . Any offence 




May 18th Phase 1 of reopening of economy and society: outdoor work is allowed to resume and shops 
that cater for mainly outdoor work is allowed to open. Groups of up to four people are allowed 
to meet outdoors within 5 km of home. Outdoor public amenities, sport and fitness activities 




June 8th Phase 2 of reopening of economy and society: travel within a county or up to 20 km from home 
if crossing county borders is allowed. Groups of up to six people are allowed to meet either 
outdoors or indoors. Organised sporting, cultural or social activities for up to 15 people are 
allowed. Other retail shows are allowed to open. Individuals who were cocooning or medically 
vulnerable individuals are allowed a small number of visitors. Funerals with up to 25 people in 




15th Retail facilities in shopping centres are allowed to open Medium Economic 
Impact 
–
29th Phase 3 of reopening of economy and society: all domestic travel restrictions lifted. Cafes, 
restaurants, hotels, hostels, galleries, museums and pubs that serve food are allowed to open 
but social distancing must be maintained. Crèches will reopen for essential workers and those 
who need childcare facilities due to returning to work. Behind closed door sporting activities 
can resume. Higher risk retail outlets such as hairdressers are allowed to open. Hospitals will 
permit a small number of visitors. Indoor leisure facilities can reopen, festivals and cultural 
activities can reopen. Indoor gatherings of up to 50 people and outdoor gatherings of up to 200 




30th Deal with private hospitals allowed to lapse due to low need Significant Prevention 
and Care 
–




15th Face masks mandatory in shops for customers and staff. Maximum of 10 people from no more 
than 4 households allowed to visit other people’s homes 
Significant Containment + 
20th “Green list” of countries published; travellers from these countries can visit Ireland without 
having to quarantine. Advice to people living in Ireland is to avoid all non-essential overseas 
travel 
Significant Containment + 
August 10th Phase 4 of reopening of economy and society : Crèches can reopen for the remaining workers. 




∗ Type: + is indicative of an escalating measure (increasing measures to respond to increasing numbers of active cases) and (-) is indicative of a de-escalating measures 
(easing of measures put in place). This is based on the definition provided by Moy et al., (2020). 
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ombat the effects of the pandemic. As the pandemic progressed, 
he use of technology has evolved. A number of Irish organisa- 
ions have provided rapid evidence reviews of health technology 
ssessment and health queries about the coronavirus and COVID- 
9 disease including the National Health Library and Knowledge 
ervice [16] , the Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) 
17] , iHealthFacts [18] and Cochrane Ireland [19] . 
During the first month of the crisis, around 1400 public service 
orkers received training in contact tracing. Many of these have 
een deployed along with existing HSE staff in a series of con- 
act tracing centres that have been set up countrywide. A special 
obile phone app to track and trace Covid-19 infections was de- 
eloped by a collaboration between the private sector and health 
uthorities and was launched on July 7th. Over 25% of the pop- 
lation downloaded the app in the week after it was launched 
20] . A recurring concern in Ireland has been the availability of 
ersonal protective equipment (PPE), which is a particular issue in 
ong-term residential care homes. The Health Research Board have 
unded local projects that avail of technology such as AI-enabled 
nalysis and participation in international consortium clinical tri- 
ls treating COVID-19 in ICU [21] . 
ealthcare system response 
CU beds 
As noted earlier, the low number of ICU beds in the public 
ealth system (255 in total or 5.5 per 10 0,0 0 0) was a particu-
arly pressing issue in Ireland at the beginning of the pandemic. 
n March 24th, the government announced that private hospitals 
ad in effect been incorporated into the public hospital system for 
he duration of the crisis. In addition, many of the public hospi- 
als increased the number of ICU beds in their own hospitals or 
dentified additional beds that could be used as ICU beds if there 
as a surge in admissions. The number of ICU beds occupied by 
onfirmed and suspected COVID-19 patients peaked in the second 
eek of April and has steadily declined since then. The increase in 
he number of ICU beds meant that there were always at least 90 
CU beds available on any particular day [10] . As far as we know, 
o hospital ever exceeded its ICU capacity. 
ecruiting additional healthcare workers 
The Irish government took a number of steps to try to main- 
ain and enhance the workforce capacity to deal with the COVID-19 
andemic. On March 17th, the Health Service Executive launched 
n international recruitment campaign, “Be on call for Ireland” to 
ncourage healthcare professionals at home and abroad to come 
nd work in the public health service [22] . The number of appli- 
ants for the Be on Call for Ireland initiative was approximately 
3,0 0 0. However, the vast majority of these were not healthcare 
rofessionals. According to the Irish Medical Council, 397 doctors 
egistered with the Council under this initiative. About one third 
f these were retired doctors returning to work. In addition to the 
e on Call initiative, a number of other recruitment initiatives took 
lace to maximise the current work force and increase capacity 
cross both the public and private healthcare providers. These in- 
luded increasing the hours of part time staff, maximising agency 
sage, rehiring of retired clinicians, redeployment of staff and en- 
ouraging those on career break to return early. 
hanging requisites to practice medicine 
The Government reached an agreement in March with the Pri- 
ate Hospitals Association to use its facilities for the treatment of 426 oth Covid-19 and non Covid-19 patients. Under the deal, 19 pri- 
ate hospitals essentially operated as public hospitals for a three 
onth period. The arrangements between the State and private 
ospitals however did not cover 600 consultants who work ex- 
lusively in the private sector. By April 23rd about one quarter 
f these consultants had signed up to a contract offered to them. 
here have been ongoing discussions around the problem of how 
o ensure that formerly private consultants are able to continue 
heir care relationship with their patients with many consultants 
trongly criticizing the arrangement between the State and the pri- 
ate hospitals. The deal has been criticised over its costs ( €115 
illion cost per month) and the relatively few patients treated in 
hese facilities [23] . The agreement lapsed at the end of June 2020. 
Other actions pertaining to changing requisites in Ireland in- 
lude: 
- Bringing forward exams for final year medical students to en- 
able them to join the workforce. 
- All student nurses were hired as healthcare assistants. 
- Reassignment of healthcare workers from private sector, and 
other external staffing supports on a needs basis. 
- Cross training of healthcare workers where needed, for exam- 
ple where retraining has occurred e.g. theatre nurses to be ICU 
nurses. 
P / Specialists operational changes 
Individuals who suspect that they have the virus are strongly 
ncouraged to contact their GP as the first point of contact. Since 
id-March, GPs have been providing the majority of their consul- 
ations over the phone or via video link. A number of Community 
ubs were established around the country. In these hubs, patients 
an be seen by a GP who can refer them to an acute hospital. There
as been ongoing concern over people delaying seeking medical 
elp because of fear of contracting COVID-19 if they attended a 
ospital or other medical clinic [24] . 
hanges in utilisation of non COVID-19 healthcare 
Systematic evidence for changes in the demand or need for 
ther types of medical care or pharmaceuticals is limited. A large 
nline survey with over 35,0 0 0 respondents conducted in the third 
eek of April found that about 32% of respondents had postponed 
edical treatment or check-ups [20] . Most of the appointments 
hat were postponed were routine medical examinations such as 
 consultation with a GP or a dentist or a post-operation follow- 
p. Parents reported that vaccinations had frequently been post- 
oned as had some pre- and post-natal appointments. Almost 5% 
aid that a medical examination in a hospital had been postponed 
nd 2% had an operation postponed. The Irish Cancer Society has 
laimed that more than 450 cancers have remained undetected 
ue to the suspension of cancer screening services [25] . 
Many mental health organizations have reported an increase in 
he use of their online and telephone services. SpunOut, which 
rovides information on a broad range of issues to young peo- 
le, said that there had been a 100% increase in people contact- 
ng them due to anxiety and depression. ALONE, an organization 
hich supports older people, reported on April 27th that there 
ad been a large increase in the number of older people contact- 
ng them about social isolation and loneliness. The number of calls 
hey were receiving from people with suicidal ideation had also 
hown a large increase. The Samaritans have also reported an in- 
rease in calls to their helpline [26] . In April, the Government an- 
ounced additional funding for online mental health services to 
upport people, especially health services staff, during the pan- 
emic. There has been a large fall in the proportion of adults re- 
orting their satisfaction with life as ‘high’ with particularly large 
B. Kennelly, M. O’Callaghan, D. Coughlan et al. Health Policy and Technology 9 (2020) 419–429 
Table 4 
Summary of key economic activity and public finance variables. 
2019 2020 2021 
Economic Activity (Per Cent Change) 
Real GDP 5.5 −10.5 6.0 
Modified Domestic Demand 3.0 −15.1 8.2 
Public Finances (Per Cent of GDP) 
General Government Balance 0.4 −7.4 −4.1 
Debt Ratio 58.8 69.1 68.4 








































































































alls among younger people [27] . Only 12% of adults reported a 
igh level of overall life satisfaction compared to over 44% in 2018. 
A survey of almost 200 psychiatrists published in the middle 
f June 2020 found that there had been a significant increase in 
he number of referrals and emergency presentations for psychi- 
tric services in the third month of the pandemic. The main factors 
dentified as influencing the increase in emergency referrals were 
ncreased social isolation and reduced access to community-based 
ental health services [28] . 
conomic and financial fluctuation 
conomic impact 
Ireland has experienced considerable economic disruption from 
he COVID-19 pandemic, with significant challenges for house- 
olds, businesses, and policymakers. A report published on April 
1st 2020 by the Department of Finance [29] set out a macroe- 
onomic and fiscal scenario for the period 2020–2021, incorporat- 
ng the potential impact of COVID-19. A significant contraction in 
odified domestic demand of 15.1% was projected for 2020 (see 
able 4 ), resulting from domestic and international effort s to com- 
at the virus. Notably, this ‘baseline’ projection assumed a tran- 
ient shock to the Irish economy, whereby activity bottoms out 
n the second quarter of 2020 and is followed by recovery, both 
omestically and internationally, later in the year. Based on such 
 scenario, the Department forecasts economic growth of 6% in 
DP in 2021 and a restoration of overall economic activity to pre- 
andemic levels in 2022 [29] . However, it warns this is based on 
uccessful containment of the virus. In May, the Economic and So- 
ial Research Institute’s forecast that real GDP would decline by 
ver 12% in 2020 under a baseline scenario that reflects continued 
hysical distancing and containment measures to the end of 2020 
30] . 
From a position of full-employment at the start of 2020, unem- 
loyment hit a record high of 28.2% in April and is set to average
7.4% for 2020, with young adults disproportionately affected [31] . 
t a sectoral level, non-food retail, entertainment and hospitality 
re among those sectors that have been hardest hit, both in terms 
f economic activity and employment. 
conomic policy response 
In terms of economic policy responses, there have been a num- 
er of measures introduced to reduce the impact on households, 
usinesses, and the economy. Broadly speaking, the Government’s 
esponse to the crisis at an economic level has involved attempting 
o reduce the impact of COVID-19-related restrictions on house- 
old incomes, and on helping businesses and firms survive until 
estrictions are relaxed [32] . This has included, for example, in- 
ome supports in the form of a flat-rate Pandemic Unemployment 
ayment of €350 per week for individuals who lose their jobs due 
o the pandemic, as well as a Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme , 
hich enables employees, whose employers are affected by the 427 andemic, to receive significant supports directly from their em- 
loyer through the payroll system. Other measures undertaken in- 
lude payment breaks on mortgage, personal, and business loans, 
iquidity funding for businesses, guaranteed loan schemes and de- 
erred tax payments, as well as moratoriums on evictions and rent 
ncreases. 
Beirne et al. [33] found that the measures announced by the 
overnment, and in particular the Pandemic Unemployment Pay- 
ent , reduced the numbers exposed to extreme income losses by 
bout a third. Nonetheless, more than 150,0 0 0 households lost be- 
ween 20% and 40% of their incomes, with smaller numbers suf- 
ering even heavier losses. The Department of Finance [29] an- 
ounced increased expenditure of €8 billion to account for mea- 
ures taken in response to COVID-19, including income supports. 
t estimates that the general government deficit could increase to 
.4% of GDP this year (see Table 4 ), or possibly as much as 10% if
he easing of restrictions is delayed and large parts of the economy 
emain closed. This large deficit is driven by both the expenditure 
easures implemented by the Government and decreases in taxa- 
ion revenue arising from reduced economic activity, and will lead 
o an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio to an estimated 69%. 
Overall, the consensus amongst economic commentators, in- 
luding the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) [ 34 , 35 ], appears to
e that Ireland, given its recent strong economic performance and 
elatively healthy public finances, is reasonably well positioned to 
eet the economic challenges of COVID-19 and that it should be 
ossible to avoid a return to severe fiscal adjustments. Nonethe- 
ess, this is predicated on the containment of the virus and a re- 
urn to normal patterns of economic activity in the second half of 
020. 
onclusions and policy implications 
Ireland has suffered substantial loss of life and health since the 
eginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. As of July 19th, 1753 peo- 
le have died with either a confirmed or suspected infection of 
OVID-19 and 25,766 have tested positive with the virus. The ef- 
ects on health and well-being from the effective lockdown of large 
arts of normal economic and social life are also very significant. 
lready, there is some evidence of an increase in mental health 
ifficulties experienced by people during the crisis. There has been 
 large fall in the proportion of adults reporting their satisfaction 
ith life as ‘high’ with particularly large falls among younger peo- 
le. To date, there have not been any estimates of the total loss of 
 broad measure of health such as QALYs nor has anybody pub- 
ished a comparison of the loss of well-being due to the lockdown 
elative to a counterfactual where a different kind of a lockdown 
r no lockdown at all had been imposed. 
In general, compliance with the various public health measures 
as been very high. At a policy level, there has been little disagree- 
ent about the various steps that have been implemented. Many 
f the limited disagreements have been more about the timing of 
articular measures than the merits of the measures themselves. 
here is a very high level of trust in NPHET and politicians from 
ll parties were generally supportive of the caretaker Government’s 
andling of the pandemic, with a strong sense of national solidar- 
ty during the crisis. 
Ireland’s response to the COVID-19 crisis has been comprehen- 
ive and timely in many respects. Transparency, a commitment to a 
elatively open data policy, the use of traditional and social media 
o inform the population, and the frequency of updates from the 
epartment of Health and the HSE are all commendable. Other ar- 
as such as testing and contact tracing took some time to work 
ffectively but have been operating efficiently in recent weeks. 
A striking feature of how the health system has prepared for 
nd responded to the COVID 19 situation is that essentially it has 






















































een identical to what a tax-financed public health system would 
nvolve. People have not been charged for any aspect of care asso- 
iated with the virus. The HSE took over the operation of private 
ospitals early in the crisis to increase capacity. While the univer- 
al, free-to-the-user nature of care for COVID-19 patients may bol- 
ter the case for a one-tier health system financed primarily by 
axation, the difficulties of moving to such a system can be seen 
n the anomalous position that many patients in the private health 
ystem found themselves in. 
Ireland’s land border with Northern Ireland is another area 
hich deserves close attention during this health emergency. 
ounties along the border with Northern Ireland are among 
hose with the highest rate of cases and deaths per capita (see 
igs. 1 and 6 ). Free movement across this border is an obvious 
ause for concern, particularly when two different public health 
nd testing strategies are being pursued in the jurisdictions. North- 
rn Ireland has thus far carried out less community testing. As of 
uly 23rd, Northern Ireland had completed 170,0 0 0 tests (90 tests 
er 10 0 0 inhabitants) [36] while the equivalent figure for the Re- 
ublic was 580,0 0 0 tests (118 tests per 10 0 0 inhabitants). There
re also significant differences in death rates between Ireland and 
orthern Ireland and between Ireland and the UK mainland [37] . 
Much of the response by healthcare decision-makers in Ire- 
and, particularly in the first month of the pandemic, focused on 
ospital-related issues. This was certainly understandable given the 
nfolding situation in some other countries. Nursing homes and 
ther residential centres did not receive sufficient attention during 
hat phase of the pandemic. The focus of attention on the hospi- 
al system can at times obscure the fact that the real battle needs 
o take place upstream in our communities, including long-term 
esidencies. Further study of the individual components of pub- 
ic health advice that has clearly worked is required so we can 
e more focused in our response to further outbreaks of COVID- 
9. Improved information on symptoms reporting by the general 
ublic or likely diagnoses observed by GPs and other healthcare 
orkers in our communities, along with better and more regular 
pdates on testing and contact tracing will all contribute to bet- 
er understanding of what is happening in our communities, the 
reeding ground for COVID-19. A further area of promise is the in- 
roduction of a contact tracing app which was downloaded by over 
 quarter of the population within a week of being launched. All of 
his additional data and research will be of utmost importance if 
e wish to be able to employ more focused yet effective measures 
ather than relying on a national lockdown. 
To conclude, we offer some brief thoughts on what lessons we 
ave learned that might help Ireland respond to a potential second 
r third wave of the pandemic. These observations, speculative as 
hey might be, may also be useful to readers and policy makers in 
ther countries. 
1 The rapid fall in the number of new cases, hospitalisations and 
deaths per day, evident in Figs. 2–4 , has been achieved in large 
part by the collective action of an overwhelming majority of 
people in Ireland. A powerful solidarity with family, neighbours 
and fellow citizens emerged quickly once the country’s leaders 
and its public health officials explained clearly what the prob- 
lem was and what was needed to mitigate the problem. We are 
hopeful that a similar sense of solidarity could be drawn on if 
a second or subsequent wave emerged. 
2 Continuing to have regular clear updates on the public health 
situation is of vital importance in maintaining the high level of 
acceptance by the public of the various non-medical interven- 
tions that are required to keep the virus transmission at his cur- 
rently low level. This will be particularly important as people 
get annoyed with the longevity of various restrictions and mea- 
sures such as being required to wear masks. People will need 428 to be reminded about why they are being asked to do what 
they are doing. Successes, such as instances where the COVID 
tracker App helps contact tracers, should be acknowledged and 
celebrated. 
3 The hospital and long-term care system in Ireland has suffered 
from significant under-investment for many years. A second 
wave during the winter when the public hospital system has 
historically operated near or beyond capacity is likely to prove a 
much more serious challenge than that posed by the first wave. 
The pandemic may have strengthened the case for a universal 
health system but it has also underlined how difficult bring- 
ing that about will be given the current hybrid model of health 
care provision and financing. Short-term interventions, such as 
the raid development of Respiratory Hubs in the community, 
need to be prioritised and adequately resourced. 
4 The public health system itself is another area that has suffered 
from many years of significant under-investment. One area of 
particular concern that the pandemic has highlighted is the lack 
of a comprehensive electronic health record system. The ab- 
sence of such a system will make dealing with a second wave 
much more challenging. 
5 As hope rise around the world that some vaccines may be avail- 
able by early 2021 and as doctors learn more about possible 
treatments for people with the virus, we think that Ireland and 
other countries should remain on a very high state of alert 
and caution. It is not yet time to consider any kind of a re- 
turn to normal business and social life. Money is cheap and 
states should continue to borrow large sums to protect indi- 
viduals and businesses for what we tentatively hope may be a 
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